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Jeffrey D. Sachs 
1.  Aims of the NBER Project on Developing Country Debt 
Latin  America  and  Africa have  suffered a collapse of  living standards 
during  the  1980s  that  in  many  countries  rivals,  and  in  some  countries 
exceeds, the declines that were suffered during the Great Depression.’ The 
1980s is widely regarded as “the Lost Decade”  of  economic development 
for large parts of  the world, and even this appellation is too optimistic for 
many countries whose living standards have fallen back to the levels of  the 
1950s and  1960~~  The collapse of  living standards is intimately related to 
the external debt crisis that hit most of  the countries of  Latin America and 
Africa  at  the  beginning  of  the  1980~.~  As  shown  in  table  1, economic 
performance-in  terms of  per capita growth, inflation, and the rate of capital 
formation  in  total  output-has  been  particularly  disastrous  in  those 
developing  countries  that  experienced  debt-servicing  difficulties  at  the 
beginning of the decade. 
Few  countries that fell into debt-servicing difficulties in the early  1980s 
have  yet  been  able  to  extricate  themselves  from  the  financial  crisis. 
Remarkably, at the end of  1988, after more than six years of the global debt 
crisis, not a single country in Latin America had regained normal access to 
loans from the private international financial  market^,^ and countries such as 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Peru  were  still  caught  in  a  dramatic  process  of 
collapsing incomes and exploding inflation. 
The NBER Project on Developing Country Debt was initiated in  1986 to 
improve our understanding of  four fundamental issues concerning the debt 
crisis. First, what were the forces, both within the debtor countries and in the 
international financial system, that contributed to the onset of the debt crisis 
in so many developing countries? Second,  what  were the mechanisms by 
which the debt crisis contributed to the decline of  living standards in  the 
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Table 1  Eeonomic Performance of  Developing Countries with and without 
Debt-Servicing Difficulties 
With Debt-Service  Without Debt- 
Problems  Service Problems 





1980- 8 1 
1982-87 
Average inflation rate 
Gross capital formation 
2.8 











Source.  IMF, World Economic Outlook,  April  1988. GDP per capita, table A6, inflation, table Al  I; gross 
capital formation, table A7. 
Nores:  Growth data are compound annual rates between the dates shown; inflation is measured as the nominal 
GDP-weighted  average  of  the  compound  inflation  rates  of  the  countries  in  the  category;  gross  capital 
formation is measured as the arithmetic average of the country ratios of  gross capital formation of  GDP. 
debtor countries in  the  1980s? Third,  what  are the  reasons why  recovery 
from the crisis has proved to be so difficult in many countries? And  fourth, 
what are the lessons of the debt crisis more generally for the proper role of 
external  borrowing  in  the  long-term  growth  strategy  of  a  developing 
country? 
To  address these questions, the NBER project was divided into two parts: 
(1) a series of  detailed country monographs, and  (2)  a series of  analytical 
studies on several aspects of the international financial system. This volume 
(vol. 2) and a companion volume (vol.  3) present the monographs on the 
country  studies.  The  analytical  studies  are  contained  in  volume  1.  A 
summary of the entire project may be found in Developing Country Debt and 
the World Economy. 
The eight countries examined in  the NBER  project (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  and  Turkey)  were 
selected in order to shed maximal light on the comparative question of why 
some  countries  succumbed to  financial  crisis  in  the  1980s  while  others 
escaped the crisis. To provide a reasonable basis for comparison, all of  the 
countries  chosen  are  middle-income,  capital-importing  countries  that 
enjoyed access to international commercial bank loans in the 1970~.~  Some 
of these countries escaped the worst of  the crisis of the  1980s, while others 
have virtually collapsed in response to the financial crisis.  An  overview of 
the very different economic performances of the eight countries can be found 
in table 2. 
While  a  debt crisis  is  a multifaceted phenomenon,  we  will  say  that  a 
country  experienced  a  debt  crisis  if  (1)  the  government  was  forced  to 
reschedule the public or publicly guaranteed debts on an extraordinary basis; 
or  (2) if  the  government  went  into  substantial arrears  on  existing  debt 3  Introduction 
Table 2  Economic Rrformance of the Eight NBER Countries 
Economic Variables by Country  1960-80  1980-85 
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Inflation rate: 
Latin America 
Argentina  78.5  342.8 
Bolivia  15.7  569.1 
Brazil  31.6  147.7 
Mexico  13.2  62.2 
Indonesia  34.3  10.7 
Philippines  5.8  7.8 
South Korea  18.7  6.0 
Turkey  20.8  37.1 
Rest of world 
Sources: GNP  growth  rates,  1960-80,  from  the  World  Bank’s World  Development  Report,  1982; for 
1980-85,  from IhW, International Financial Statistics. Inflation rate is average annual rate of  inflation from 
the World  Bank’s  World Development Report, 1987. 
payments  for  more  than  ninety  days.  In  all  cases  in  which  (1)  or  (2) 
occurred,  the  government  also  lost  access  to  normal  lending  from  the 
international capital markets.  New  lending,  to  the extent that  it could be 
achieved  at  all,  came only  in  the  context of  so-called concerted  lending 
programs, in which existing creditors agree as a group to make new loans in 
proportion  to  their  existing  exposure.  Table  3  shows  the  timing  of 
debt-servicing difficulties and the dates of the first formal debt-rescheduling 
agreements. As shown in the table,  Indonesia and Korea escaped the debt 
crisis entirely according to these criteria; Turkey fell into crisis in the late 
1970s,  bur  overcame  it  by  1983,  when  the  country  no  longer  needed 
additional debt  reschedulings and  gained  renewed  access to  international 
borrowing; and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines fell 
into crisis in the early 1980s and had not recovered by the end of  1988. 
A useful measure of the depth of the debt crisis in each of the countries is 
shown in the last column of  table 3, which records the secondary market 
value of  the commercial bank debt of the eight countries, as of June 1988. 
The secondary market price is a simple index of  a country’s creditworthi- 
ness,  since  it  reflects  the  market’s  expectation  of  the  proportion  of  the 4  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3  Debtor Government Relations with Commercial Bank Creditors for the Eight 
NBER Countries, 1W7-88 
Date of First  Date of  First  Date of  Price 
Debt-Service  Rescheduling  Renewed  of Debt, 
Difficulties  Agreement  Market Access  June 1988 
Argentina  1982  1985  Nob  27 
Bolivia  1979  1980  No  13 
Brazil  1983  1983  No  53 
Indonesia  nonea  none  na  na 
Mexico  1982  1983  No  53 
South Korea  none  none  na  na 
Philippines  1984  1986  No  55 
Turkey  1978  1979  1983  99 
Sources: The dates of  the first debt-service difficulties are taken from the individual country monographs (the 
dates refer to the interruption of debt servicing on commercial bank debt). The timing of the debt rescheduling 
agreements  may  be  found  in  the  World  Bank,  World  Debr  Tables,  1987-88  edition,  table  IV-3, 
pp. xxxvi-xlii.  Only ’hrkey has regained access to the private capital markets, as of  1983. See the Turkey 
monograph by Celasun and Rcdrik (vol. 3) for details. The price of debt refers to the asking price per $100 of 
par value of commercial bank debt, from Salomon Brothers, “Indicative  Prices for Less Developed Country 
Bank Loans,”  9 June 1988. Note that there are no price quotations for Indonesia and South Korea. 
“Indonesia experienced a limited external debt crisis in  1975, with foreign borrowing by the state petroleum 
company, Pertamina. This was not a generalized external debt crisis, and it was quickly resolved by  1977. 
See Woo and Nasution’s monograph on Indonesia (vol. 3). 
bNot yet renewed access. 
na = not applicable 
outstanding debt  that  a  country  will  service  in  the  long  run.  The  most 
creditworthy nation, Korea, has bank debt that trades at par, reflecting very 
little fear in the international capital markets of a future default by these two 
countries. For this reason, Korea’s debt is not generally listed in quotations 
of  secondary market prices for sovereign debt. Turkey’s secondary market 
price is also nearly at par, reflecting Turkey’s recovery of creditworthiness 
since the mid-1980s. The Latin American debt, by  contrast, traded in June 
1988 at about 50 percent of face value, and Bolivia traded at only 13 percent 
of par value, reflecting the fact that Bolivia experienced the deepest crisis in 
Latin America during the first half of the 1980~.~ 
Table 4  records the structure of the medium- and long-term external debt 
of  the eight countries as  of  the  end  of  1986, both  according to  kind  of 
creditor (i.e.,  whether  the  debt is owed to  official creditors or to private 
markets, mainly the banks) and to the kind of debtor (i.e., whether the debt 
is  a liability of  the private or of  the public  sector).  The creditor class of 
public and publicly guaranteed debt is available from the World Bank’s Debt 
Tables, but the creditor class of  the private sector, nonguaranteed debt is not 
published. To  construct the first two columns of  table 4, therefore, it was 
necessary to assume that  all debt of  the private sector is owed to foreign 
private creditors. 
Note that in all of the countries, the bulk of the debt is owed by  the public 
sector or is publicly guaranteed debt of  the private ~ector.~  This is a very 5  Introduction 
Table 4  Structure of Medium- and Long-Term Debt by Category of Creditor and 
Debtor (billions of U.S. $,  end of 1986) 
Creditor  Debtor 

























Source:  World Bank,  World Debt Tubles, 1987-88  edition. To construct the table,  it was assumed that all 
private nonguaranteed debt is owed to private creditors. The designation “official”  in the debtor classification 
refers to debt of the public sector plus private sector debt with a guarantee by  the public sector of the debtor 
country. 
Note:  Proportion of  total debt is in parentheses. 
significant fact, with two profound implications. First, the debt signifies not 
only  a  burden  on  the  country’s  exports  but  also  a  burden  on  the  fiscal 
resources,  since government revenues must  be  used  to  service the public 
debt. Second, whereas an overhang of debt owed by private sector firms can 
be settled through bankruptcy and debt-to-equity conversions, writedowns, 
and buybacks arranged on an ad hoc basis, the public sector debt is not so 
easily discharged in the same manner. The available evidence suggests that, 
as a result, the private sector debt has been gradually extinguished through a 
number  of  ad  hoc  arrangements,  while  the  public  sector  debt  has  been 
growing over time in most countries.8 
The proportion of  the total debt owed to official versus private foreign 
creditors differs significantly across countries. In  Argentina, Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico, and the Philippines, most of  the debt is owed to private financial 
markets (mostly banks), while in Bolivia, Indonesia, and Turkey, a higher 
proportion of  the debt is owed to official creditors. The high proportion of 
official debt in these countries mainly reflects their lower per capita income, 
which made them less attractive to the banks for lending in the  1970s and 
made them  more eligible and attractive for various forms of  concessional 
official credits.’ 
Table 5 records the dramatic reversal of the net resource transfer from the 
private international capital markets (mainly banks) to the public sector of 6  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 5  Net Flows of  Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt,  1980-86  (as percentage of 
GDP, average per year) 
Country  1980-8 1  1982-84  1985-86 
Argentina 
Net flows  .8  2.7  2.4 
Net resource transfers  .3  .7  -  1.8 
Net flows  4.7  -  .3  -.I 
Net resource transfers  1 .o  -3.4  -  .5 
Net flows  1.9  2.3  -  .3 
Net resource transfers  .2  .2  -2.2 
Net flows  1 .o  I .5  .7 
Net resource transfers  .4  .7  -  .2 
Net flows  3.0  2.  I  -.I 
Net resource transfers  1.1  -1.8  -4.3 
Net flows  1.7  1.9  1.5 
Net resource transfers  1 .o  .8  -  .4 
Net flows  .6  .4  .7 







Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1987-88  edition 
most countries after the onset of the debt crisis. The financial flows of public 
and publicly guaranteed debt from the private markets are measured in two 
ways  in the  table  (in both  cases  as  a percentage of  the debtor country’s 
GDP). “Net flows” are loan disbursements minus loan amortizations during 
the year.  The  “net  resource transfers”  are new  loan disbursements minus 
total  debt  servicing (interest  plus  amortizations).  Thus,  the  net  resource 
transfer is equal to net loans minus interest payments. 
After 1982, the Latin American countries were able to obtain new bank 
loans only  as part  of  so-called  involuntary or concerted lending packages 
(Bolivia received no funds in that form). In general, these concerted lending 
packages were more extensive during  1982-84  than  later, so that  the net 
resource transfers became more negative during 1985- 86 than earlier. 
Explanations of the Debt Crisis 
In examining why some of the countries succumbed to a debt crisis while 
others did not, an explanation can be attempted on several different levels. 
At  the most  superficial level,  it  is clear that  the ratio of  a country’s debt 
relative to its export earnings as of  1981  is a good, though by  no means 
perfect,  predictor of  whether it fell into debt crisis during the  1980s. As 
shown in  table 6, the countries with the highest ratios tended to be those 
which fell into debt crisis,  while the two countries with the lowest ratios 
(Indonesia and South Korea) were those that escaped the crisis without any 
debt restructuring. 7  Introduction 
Table 6  Debt Ratios on the Eve of the Debt Crisis, 1981 
Country  Debt-GDP Ratio  Debt-Export Ratio 
Argentina  65.6  301.6 
Bolivia  104.1  305.5 
Brazil  30.3  296.3 
Indonesia  25.4  91.2 
Mexico  34.0  257.5 
Philippines  54.2  242.8 
South Korea  50.4  122.1 
'hrkey  33.4  326.8 
~~~~  ~ 
Source:  All data are from the World Bank, WorldDebt Tables, 1987-88  editlon. 
Note:  The data refer to total external debt (public plus private medium- and long-term debt, plus short-term debt). 
Unfortunately,  this  finding  (which  has  been  reported  in  many  econo- 
metric  studies) doesn't  really  take  us  very  far.  Why  did  the  debt-export 
ratio grow  so rapidly in Brazil, but not in Korea? Interestingly, as shown 
in  the table, Korea had  as much  debt as Brazil relative  to GNP and yet 
maintained much  lower debt relative  to  exports  because of  the high  and 
rising share of  exports in  GNP.  At the very least, we  would like to know 
how  the  economic  policies  of  the  different  governments  affected  the 
evolution of  export promotion and debt accumulation. Even more deeply, 
we  would  like to understand how  various underlying social and  political 
factors (e.g., the distribution of  political influence among competing social 
groups, the  structure of  government, the  nature  of  electoral competition, 
etc.) have been  important determinants of  the economic policy choices of 
each of the governments. 
The NBER project seeks to shed light on  the causes of  the debt crisis at 
each of these levels of explanation, both the economic and the political. The 
attention to political factors might seem out of place to some readers. In the 
course of  our research, however, it became very clear that the debt crisis is 
in large part a crisis of failed policy choices in the debtor countries, and that 
the policy  choices themselves  are  best  explained by  appeal to  important 
political as well as economic characteristics of  the countries under study. 
In  addition  to  focussing  on  the  origins  of  the  debt  crisis,  the  country 
monographs examine the mechanics of  a debt crisis once it is underway. They 
also reveal in considerable detail the profound economic and political difficulties 
that are encountered by countries attempting to recover from a large debt and a 
sudden cutoff of  foreign lending. In  the  rest  of  this essay, I summarize the 
findings of the country monographs on these issues. Section 2 is a discussion of 
the origins of the debt crisis in a comparative perspective. In section 3 I describe 
the macrodynamics of the debt crisis in the countries worst hit by  the external 
shocks in the late 1980s. In section 4 I use the country experiences to examine the 
pressing policy problem of  how to recover from a debt crisis and to explore 
why recovery has proved so elusive in most of the Latin American countries. 
Section 5 provides a summary of  the findings. 8  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
2.  Comparative Evidence on the Origins of the Debt Crisis 
The country studies volumes and the analytical studies in volume 1 shed 
considerable light  on  the  origins  of  the  debt  crisis.  As  described in  the 
International Financial System volume in  chapters by  Barry  Eichengreen, 
and  Peter H. Lindert and Peter J.  Morton,  debt crises have been  episodic 
features of  the  world  economy for the past  175 years.  The wave  of  new 
lending to the LDCs that began in the early 1970s looks very much like the 
burst of new lending to the LDCs in the 1820s, 1870s, 1890s, and 1920s. In 
each  episode,  a  wave  of  new  lending  was  soon  followed  by  a  sharp 
retrenchment of  lending and a widespread debt crisis,  requiring substantial 
renegotiations of  debt contracts and often involving widespread defaults. 
There is little doubt that major unforeseen external shocks at the end of the 
1970s and early  1980s, especially the rise in  world  interest rates and the 
decline in  the relative price of  primary commodity exports  of  the debtor 
countries, played a major role in sparking the developing country debt crisis, 
as did similar macroeconomic shocks in  the earlier historical episodes. At 
the same time, the NBER country monographs clearly reveal two additional 
facts about  the  crisis:  (1)  the effects of  the external shocks on  economic 
performance in  a  particular  debtor  country  depended  importantly  on  the 
quality of  economic management in that country during the years when the 
borrowing was underway; and (2) even after the external shocks hit, in 1979 
and  1980, there was time for policymakers to make adjustments in national 
policy to meliorate the shocks. Important adjustments were indeed made in 
some countries (e.g., Korea and Indonesia, and Turkey after 1979), but not 
in the Latin American countries or the Philippines. 
The external shocks were particularly important for the following reason. 
During the heady days of the 1970s when commodity export prices rose at 
annual rates that were greater than the interest rate on new loans, countries 
and  their  banks  had  the  illusion  of  an  unending  Ponzi  game  (see  my 
introduction to the summary volume for a further discussion of  this point). 
Countries that borrowed all that they needed to repay interest and principal 
on past loans had a debt that grew at the rate of interest. As long as nominal 
export  earnings were  growing  even faster than  this  (which was  the  case 
because of the steady rise of export prices), it was possible to borrow all of 
the funds needed to service past debt and at the same time enjoy a falling 
debt-to-export ratio. It seemed too good to be true: loans could be paid back 
out of  new  loans without provoking a rising debt-export ratio. And  indeed, 
as  shown  in  table  7,  despite  the  heavy  borrowing  of  the  1970s,  the 
developing countries as a whole had a debt-export ratio at the end of  1980 
that was about the same or even lower than in 1973! To the countries and to 
the banks, a money machine seemed to be at hand." 
Once interest rates rose and export prices started to fall, the debt-export 
ratios shot up dramatically. As shown in table 7, the increase between  1979 9  Introduction 
Table 7  Debt-Export Ratios of Developing Countries, 1973-87 
Country Grouping  1973  1980  1982  1987 
All nonoil developing countries  115.4  112.9  148.3  155.1 
Western Hemisphere  176.2  178.4  271.8  346.3 
Asia  92.9  68.2  87.1  89.1 
Source:  For  1973 and  1980 IMF,  World Economic  Outlook,  1983,  table 33. For  1982 and  1987: World 
Economic  Outlook, 1989, table A48. Note that for the category “nonoil developing countries”  for 1982 and 
1987, I referred to the category “nonfuel exporters’’ in table A48. 
and 1982 was dramatic, particularly in Africa and Latin America. Suddenly, 
the  old  Ponzi  scheme was  no  longer  working.  Unless  countries actually 
began to service the debts out of their own resources, i.e., by running trade 
surpluses, the debt-export ratios were bound  to explode,  and indeed they 
started to. In a sense, it was not until the rise of  interest rates and fall of 
export prices at the end of the 1970s that the most basic question on the debt 
was posed for each country: Could and would the country repay its debts out 
of  national income, rather than out of new borrowing? 
It is easy to show that size of the external shocks on a country-by-country  basis 
was not decisive in answering this question.” Consider in table 8, for example, 
the size of the terms-of-trade shocks in each of the eight NBER countries. The 
terms-of-trade shock is measured as the change in each country’s terms of trade 
(comparing the average for 1980-82  with the average for 1977-79)  multiplied 
by  the 1980 share of total imports in GNF?  This measure roughly indicates the 
income loss as a percentage of  GNP that resulted directly from the fall in each 
country’s export prices relative to import prices. 
Five of  the eight countries experienced a terms-of-trade deterioration if 
1980-82  is compared with  1977-79,  but there is no relation between the 
size of the shock and the depth of the subsequent crisis. Bolivia and Mexico, 
for example, fell into a deep debt crisis despite an improvement in the terms 
Table 8  Terms-of-Trade Shocks, 1979-83 
Terms of Trade 
Share of Exports 
1979  1983  (2) t  (1)  inGNP, 1981  Size of Shock 
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) = [(3) -  (1)1  x  (4) 
Argentina 







102  96 
77  99 
114  87 
73  97 
77  98 
I12  99 
127  101 
























-  1.8 
Sources:  Terms-of-trade data from the World  Bank’s Work Development Report,  1984 edition for  1979 data 
and  1987 edition for  1983 data. Share of exports in GDP from table 9 in this chapter. 10  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
of  trade. It is true that by  1982, export prices were beginning to fall in these 
two countries, but judged  over a ten-year perspective, export prices were 
high,  not  low.  On  the other hand,  Korea  suffered a  sharp terms-of-trade 
decline after 1979, but it largely escaped the debt crisis. 
It is apparent that other country-specific factors must have played a large 
role  in  determining the  effects  of  the  external  shocks on  the  individual 
economies.  The  NBER  country  monographs  suggest  that  the  following 
country-specific factors were most important: 
1. The shocks were less harmful in countries which had previously adopted 
a  successful long-term growth  strategy,  based  on  an  outward-oriented 
trade regime, a competitive exchange rate, and prudent $fiscal policies. 
2. The shocks were less harmful when foreign borrowing had contributed to 
a higher rate of capital accumulation in the 1970s, as opposed to a higher 
level of consumption spending or greater capital flight. 
3.  The shocks were less harmful when the government had adjusted rapidly 
to  the  external  shocks  in  the  early  1980s,  rather  than  postponing 
adjustment measures. 
I now examine each of these points in detail. 
The Long-Term Growth Strategy 
Trade and Exchange Rates 
The  benefits  of  outward-oriented trade  policies  have  now  been  firmly 
established by  the economics literature, and the monographs in  the NBER 
project lend further support to the existence of  long-term benefits from an 
outward-oriented trade strategy.  l2 Outward orientation refers to the balance 
of  incentives given by  the  trade regime to  export  sectors versus  import- 
competing  sectors.  Outward-oriented  regimes  are  typically  defined  as 
regimes that are neutral between the sectors or on balance more favorable to 
exports.  Importantly, the authors of  the monographs for Korea and Turkey 
stress  that  in  practice,  outward-orientation  can  be  very  different  from 
laissez-faire.  Korea,  for example,  had  a  very  interventionist trade policy 
with heavy import protection, but it has balanced the anti-export biases of 
the import restrictions with highly favorable fiscal incentives for exports. 
Table  9  provides  some  indicators  of  the  trade  regime  of  the  various 
countries in the NBER project.I3 The table reports a World  Bank index of 
trade orientation for  1973-77  and  1978-85,  as  well  as  the  export-GNP 
ratios for the economies for 1960, 1980, and  1985. Korea has the highest 
index of outward orientation of the economies and, consistent with that, has 
had  the  most  marked  increase  in  the  export-GNP  ratio  of  all  eight 
economies. Turkey moved from a posture of  moderate inward orientation in 
the 1970s to one of moderate outward orientation in the 1980s, according to 
the World  Bank index,  and the export-intensity of  the economy increased 11  Introduction 
Table 9  Indicators of Trade Structure and Policy 
Index of  Share of Primary 
Trade Regime  Exports in Total  Export Share of GNP 
Country  1963-73  1973-85  1981  1960  1980  1985 
Argentina  1  1  80  10  13“  15 
Bolivia  2  1  97”  13  17  18 
Brazil  3  3  59  5  9  14 
lndonesia  3  2  96  13  31  23 
Mexico  2  2  73b  10  14  16 
South Korea  4  4  10  3  37  36 
Turkey  1  3  63  3  7  19 
Sources.  The trade orientation index varies from 1 to 4,  with  1 being the most inward oriented and 4 being the 
most outward oriented. The index is taken from the WorldDevelopment Report (1987,  83) of  the World Bank. 
The share of primary exports in total exports is from the World Developmenr Report, table  10, various years. 
The export-GDP ratios measure the exports of goods and nonfactor services as a percentage of domestic GNP. 
They are from various editions of the World Developmenr Report:  1960 data from 1981 edition; 1980 data 
from 1982 edition; 1985 data from 1987 edition. 
“1979. 
b1983 
Philippines  2  2  55  I1  20  22 
sharply  after  1980,  apparently  in  line  with  the  shift  in  trade  regime. 
Interestingly,  Turkey is also the clearest case of recovery from a debt crisis, 
a recovery that Merih Celdsun and Dani Rodrik (vol. 3) attribute importantly 
to the boom in export earnings after 1980. 
All  of  the  Latin  American  countries  are  judged  to  be  moderately  or 
extremely  inward oriented,  except for Brazil during the  1970s, which was 
designated  by  the  World  Bank  as moderately  outward  oriented.  No  Latin 
American country  showed an important  rise in  the  share of  manufacturing 
exports in  GNP during  the  1970s;  the  rise  in Mexico’s  export-GNP ratio 
between  1970 and  1980 is more than  accounted  for by  the  increase  in  oil 
exports as a percentage of GNP. 
The benefits of an outward-oriented trade strategy, especially for a country 
engaged in extensive  foreign borrowing,  come through  very clearly in  the 
country monographs. With an inward-oriented trade strategy, foreign borrow- 
ing is directed to privately profitable but socially unprofitable sectors, leading 
to a buildup of  inefficient import-competing  industries that eventually prove 
to  be  unable  to  generate  the  foreign  exchange  necessary  to  service  the 
accumulated  foreign  debt.  This  point,  which  was  spelled  out  in  simple 
theoretical terms by  Brecher  and  Diaz Alejandro  (1977),  is amply demon- 
strated by the NBER monographs. l4  Once debt repayments became necessary 
in Latin America, the foreign exchange earnings could be generated only with 
tremendous political and economic difficulty  since the manufacturing sector 
could only begin exporting with a large cut in real wages.15 
The  protected  manufacturing  sectors  in  Latin  America  rely  heavily  on 
imported  inputs  in  the  production  process.  When  the  terms  of  trade 12  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
deteriorated  in  the  early  1980s,  and  when  new  lending  stopped  from 
international  capital  markets,  the  imported  inputs  also  dried  up  (or  rose 
sharply  in  price  relative  to  nontraded  goods),  forcing  much  of  the 
manufacturing  sector into a sharp contraction.16 These firms could  stay  in 
operation only with very substantial cuts in real wages. 
The outward-oriented regime in Korea,  by contrast, avoided many of  the 
static  inefficiencies  of  inward orientation,  reduced  Korea's  vulnerability  to 
external shocks, and also offered Korea various dynamic benefits, including 
the  opportunity  for  export  firms  to  exploit  economies  of  scale  and 
opportunities  for learning-by-doing by producing for a large world  market. 
The  outward-oriented  trade  strategy,  with  its  focus  on  spurring  export 
growth,  seems to offer the additional benefit of forcing policymakers to pay 
careful  attention  to  exchange  rate  management.  In  Korea,  as  well  as in 
Indonesia,  and  in  Turkey  after  1980,  policymakers  have  devalued  the 
currency in a timely  fashion in order to avoid a costly loss of international 
competitiveness for the export firms. 
In Latin America, by contrast, devaluations are typically avoided until the 
last possible  moment.  As long  as the central bank  has  a minimal  level of 
reserves  or access  to  international  loans, nominal  exchange  rates  are  held 
fixed  despite  internal  cost  inflati~n.'~  The  result  is  that  exporters  are 
squeezed  by  an  overvalued  real  exchange  rate.  This  kind  of  chronic 
overvaluation adds a further barrier (in addition to the trade regime) to the 
development of  a dynamic nontraditional export base.  The Latin American 
tendency toward overvaluation on the official exchange rate at the end of the 
1970s and the early 1980s (after the global shocks) is illustrated in table 10, 
where I show a measure of the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the United States 
for the eight NBER countries, comparing  1979-82  with a base of  1978. We 
can  see that  in  Argentina,  Bolivia, Mexico, and  the  Philippines,  the  real 
exchange rate appreciated in real terms, while it was stable or depreciating in 
Brazil, Indonesia,  South Korea,  and Turkey. '' 
Table 10  The Real Exchange Rate, 1978-82 (local currency vis-a-vis the U.S., 
1978 = 100) 
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Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics. 
Note: The real exchange rate vis-his  the U.S. is calculated as P/EP*, where P is the CPI of  the country,  E 
is the exchange rate in units of  domestic currency per  U.S.$, and P*  is the  U.S.  CPI. A rise  in the index 
signifies a currency appreciation. 13  Introduction 
The  inward-oriented  trade  structure  in  Latin  America  bolsters,  in  a 
political  sense,  the  tendency toward  an  overvalued exchange  rate.  Since 
exporters  who  favor  devaluations  are  limited  mainly  to  the  primary 
commodity sectors, devaluations in Latin America are typically opposed by 
most of the influential economic actors. There is no countervailing pressure 
for timely devaluations from a large manufacturing export sector, as there is 
in Korea and, increasingly, in Indonesia and Turkey.”  Urban workers and 
firms operating in the sheltered manufacturing sector view  devaluations as 
serving mainly to raise domestic costs and reduce real wages and to increase 
the  rents  earned  by  primary  commodity  exporters,  whose  supplies  are 
deemed (incorrectly) to be inelastic in  any event. 
The policy of maintaining fixed nominal exchange rates in Latin American 
countries, despite an overvaluation of the currency, was an important reason 
for  foreign  borrowing  by  the  public  sector.  In  Argentina,  Bolivia,  and 
Mexico, in particular, the central banks borrowed heavily in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to gain foreign reserves in order to support the exchange rate 
in the face of  massive private capital flight, which in turn was prompted by 
fears of  an  impending devaluation (as well  as more  generalized fears  of 
political  and  economic  instability).  ’O  In  the  period  of  heaviest  foreign 
borrowing,  1976-85,  it  has  been  estimated that  about  two-thirds  of  the 
increase in  gross external debt in  Argentina and  Mexico went  to  finance 
private capital flight, as is shown in table 11  .21 The bulk of this capital flight 
was  concentrated before  1983, during this  period  in  which  the  monetary 
authorities were holding fixed an overvalued exchange rate. In Brazil, where 
capital control restrictions were in place and where the exchange rate did not 
become so overvalued, private capital outflows were significantly smaller than 
in Argentina and Mexico. In Indonesia and Korea, capital flight was a much 
smaller fraction of  total borrowing, largely because real exchange rates did 
not become highly overvalued in the critical period, 1979-82.”  In Indonesia, 
’Lgble 11  Estimates of Capital Flight,  1976-84 
Change in Gross Debt  Estimated Capital  Flight  Ratio 





























Sources:  For  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  and  South  Korea,  from  R. Cumby  and  R. M. 
Levich, On the Definition  and Magnitude  of  Recent  Capital Flight, NBER  Working Paper no.  2275 (June 
1987), tables  1-5.  The  “Morgan”  definition of  capital  flight is the  one  repeated here.  For  Bolivia  and 
Indonesia, from Morgan Guaranty,  World Financial Markets (March 1986). table 10, p. 13. Note that  these 
sources did not contain estimates for Turkey. 
‘For  Bolivia and Indonesia, data are for 1976-85. 14  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
for example, there was little capital flight between 1976 and 1985, despite the 
fact that the country has completely free international capital mobility, a point 
noted by  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution (vol. 3).23 
Another,  and  more  subtle link  between  the  exchange rate  and  foreign 
borrowing results from the fact that in several Latin American economies, 
the public sector is a large net exporter, while the private sector is a large net 
importer. In Bolivia and Mexico, for example, the major export earnings are 
garnered by  state enterprises that produce primary  commodity exports.  In 
this circumstance, an overvaluation of the exchange rate can lead directly to 
a worsening of the budget deficit and thereby to increased foreign borrowing 
by  the public sector.24 
The Fiscal Balance 
More generally, the management of fiscal policy, along with trade policy, was 
the second main determinant of  which countries succumbed to a debt crisis. The 
importance of  fiscal  policy  results  from  the  fact  that  most  of  the  foreign 
borrowing in the  1970s was undertaken by  the public sector or by  the private 
sector with public guarantees. We  saw in table 4 that more than 80 percent of the 
external debt at  the end of  1986 was held by  the public sector.=  The heavy 
indebtedness of the public sector poses special problems for debt servicing since 
the public sector has to generate resources in order to service the debt. 
The foreign debt servicing in this case therefore requires two  resource 
transfers: first, from the private sector to the public sector, and then from the 
public sector to the rest of  the world. The first kind of  transfer requires a 
coherent set of fiscal policies; the second, an outward-oriented trade strategy 
and realistic exchange rates. 
The centrality of  fiscal policy in the debt crisis is emphasized in all of the 
country  monographs.  In  Latin  America,  Turkey,  and  the  Philippines, 
governments ran chronically large budget deficits in the years leading up to 
the  debt crisis,  and  often relied  on  foreign borrowing  to  finance current 
spending as well as capital expenditures. Moreover, the deterioration of the 
terms of  trade in  the  1980s caused a large loss of revenues, while higher 
interest rates raised the cost of  debt servicing, so that the external shocks 
pushed the economies toward large deficits. 
Budget deficits  were  large at  the end  of  the  1970s in  all  of  the  Latin 
American countries and rose very sharply in the early 1980s, after the rise in 
world interest rates and the fall in export prices. As I will discuss later, the 
failure of  the Latin American countries to close the gaping budget deficits 
after 1982, combined with the inability to finance the deficits with foreign 
borrowing, is the explosive mix that has fueled the high inflations throughout 
the region in recent years. 
The Uses of  Foreign Borrowing 
The trade  regime and  fiscal policy  management  played  a  large role  in 
determining the  ways  that  foreign borrowing was  utilized.  In  Korea,  for 15  Introduction 
example, foreign borrowing  largely financed investments in heavy industry 
that provided the basis for the export surge in the mid-1980s.  It is safe to 
conclude  that  the  foreign  borrowing  financed  investment  spending  rather 
than  consumption,  since domestic  saving rates  rose  throughout  the  whole 
period of heavy foreign borrowing in the 1970s. 
In the inward-oriented regimes in Latin America, foreign borrowing was 
much more likely to support consumption, capital flight, and investment in 
nontradables, than it was to augment the manufacturing export base. As we 
saw in table 1  1, foreign borrowing was associated with heavy capital flight in 
three of the Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia,  and Mexico. In 
Argentina, it is hard to identify any broad sector of  the economy in which 
investment expenditure was spurred as a result of foreign borrowing, except 
for a binge of  consumer durables purchases on the eve of  the exchange rate 
crisis of  198  1. 
In Mexico it appears that the small share of foreign borrowing that did not 
finance  capital  flight  was  used  to  increase  government  transfers  and 
government  investment  in  the  oil  sector,  much  of  which  proved  to  be 
unprofitable when oil prices started to fall after 198  1. In Bolivia, the foreign 
borrowing financed extensive capital  flight, some worthwhile development 
of the natural gas sector, and several major “white elephant”  projects which 
have since been abandoned. 
In Brazil,  domestic savings fell so sharply in the  1970s that despite the 
heavy foreign borrowing in that decade, national investment rates were lower 
in the late seventies (during the borrowing boom) than in the early seventies. 
Most of this decline was due to a fall in public sector savings as a percentage 
of GNP (i.e., a larger public deficit on the current account of the budget), 
suggesting that the borrowing  really  served to finance current government 
expenditures, such as subsidies on energy consumption. 
In Turkey, much of the surge in foreign borrowing was associated with the 
convertible Turkish lira deposit accounts (CTLDs) discussed by Cellsun and 
Rodrik.  This  financial  mechanism  effectively  gave  large  subsidies  to 
investment projects  financed with foreign loans.  Thus, Turkey sustained  a 
large  investment  boom  as  the  counterpart  of  the  foreign borrowing.  It  is 
evident that much of the investment  was rather inefficient,  but at the same 
time,  Cellsun and Rodrik  suggest that the increased investment  played  an 
important  role  in  generating  manufacturing  capacity  for Turkey’s  export 
boom in the 1980s. 
In  the  Philippines,  heavy  foreign  borrowing  was  used  to  finance  a 
significant increase in public sector investment, but much of this expenditure 
proved to be highly inefficient. As Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
stress: 
The  expansion  of  investment  had  a  particularly  large  construction 
component, much of  it in public or quasi-public  facilities: luxury hotels, 
cultural centers, and some of the notorious projects of Imelda Marcos such 
as the villa built entirely of coconut produc  or the University  of  Life. 16  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Other investments  were  hurt  by  changes  in  world  demand  and  prices. 
These  include  major  investments  in  copper  refining,  sugar  mills,  and 
arguably, the nuclear power plant that the Philippines built.  (1989, 176) 
Favoritism in allocating loans, kickbacks on government  procurement,  and 
the general use of public investment funds to enrich the Marcos  “cronies” 
all  contributed  to  giving  the  Philippines  the  highest  ICOR  (incremental 
capital output ratio) in Southeast Asia. 
Finally,  with respect to Indonesia,  Woo and Nasution  stress that foreign 
borrowing was kept at a moderate pace (indeed the 1981 debt-GNP ratio for 
Indonesia  was  the  lowest  for  the  eight  NBER  countries),  was  tightly 
screened,  and was  used  in  a  balanced  manner  to  support  export-oriented 
agriculture as well  as industry  for the domestic  market.  Capital flight  was 
moderate despite the complete absence of capital controls. Woo and Nasution 
stress that political  considerations  under  Soeharto have led to a consistent 
emphasis on support for the rural agricultural sector,26 which in turn has led 
the government to avoid an overvalued exchange rate which would  tend to 
squeeze the agricultural sector. 
Policy Adjustments to External Shocks, 1979-82 
The rise in world interest rates and the fall in commodities prices in  1979 
and  after caught most  policymakers  throughout  the  world  off  guard.  Real 
interest  rates  had  been  negative  between  1973 and  1978,  and  they  were 
widely forecasted in 1979 to remain low or negative for many years into the 
future.  Similarly, commodities prices  boomed  again in  1979 as they had in 
1974, and there was little basis for believing that they would soon collapse to 
levels in real terms that had not prevailed since the Great Depression. 
Nonetheless,  already  in  late  1978 there  were  enough  clouds  on  the 
economic horizon to cause prudent policymakers in developing countries to 
pause  from  an  aggressive  strategy  of  foreign  borrowing.  Upon  Paul 
Volcker’s accession to power as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board at 
the end of  1978, short-term dollar-denominated interest rates (e.g., LIBOR) 
began  to rise  sharply-part  of  a  strategy  to  stabilize  the  dollar-reaching 
what was then a postwar high of fifteen percentage points on six-month loans 
in June  1979. Real interest rates (the interest rate minus the inflation rate of 
the past twelve months) also reached  the highest  levels of the past several 
years  by  mid-1979.  Moreover,  several  important  borrowing  countries  had 
already begun to experience debt difficulties: Peru, as of 1976; Turkey, as of 
1977; and Jamaica, as of  1978.” 
It is fascinating to compare the policy reactions of the various countries to 
the shifting economic environment  in  1979-80.  These reactions were very 
important  in  affecting  the  later  development  of  the  crisis, since  in  Latin 
America in particular,  a remarkably  large proportion  of the total debt as of 
1982 had  been  incurred  in just  two  years,  1980 and  1981.  We  also saw 
earlier that  it was  in these few years that the debt-export  ratios jumped to 
their  dangerous  levels.  As  pointed  out  in  Sachs  (1987), the  net  debt  of 17  Introduction 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to BIS-area banks nearly doubled in the two 
years between December 1979 and December 1981.”  On the whole, Korea, 
Indonesia, and Turkey responded appropriately to the deteriorating interna- 
tional  situation,  while  the  Latin  American  countries  and  the  Philippines 
either  ignored  the  ominous  signs  from  abroad  or  even  accelerated their 
foreign borrowing  in  a  misguided  attempt to  counteract the  recessionary 
effects of the external shocks. 
It  is  instructive to  give  a  schematic description  of  the  policy  choices 
undertaken in various countries during this crucial period. Characteristically, 
Korea proved to be the most prudent of the countries in the study. As early as 
spring  1979, Korea  embarked on  a Comprehensive Stabilization Program 
(CSP) and a retrenchment from the high rates of borrowing of the mid-to-late 
1970s. The CSP included a turn to tighter monetary and fiscal policy, as well 
as a reallocation of  investment from heavy  industry to  other less capital- 
intensive sectors. Nineteen  eighty proved  to be a deep crisis year  for the 
economy (as a result of  internal political unrest, a failed harvest, external 
shocks,  and  the  internal adjustment effort).  Nonetheless, the  stabilization 
program  was  maintained  and  strengthened,  in  part  through  a  significant 
depreciation of the exchange rate and a further tightening of fiscal policies. 
Indonesia  was  also  relatively  well  positioned  in  the  crucial  period  of 
1979-82.  In  1978, Indonesia devalued the rupiah significantly in order to 
spur nontraditional exports.  Moreover, Indonesia enjoyed a terms-of-trade 
boom  in  1979-80,  in  line with  the  second  OPEC oil  shock.  Because  of 
moderate fiscal policies during  1979- 82, Indonesia actually decreased its 
external debt net of foreign exchange reserves in that period. 
Turkey was  “lucky”  in  having  experienced  its  debt crisis  as  early  as 
1977-78.  By January 1980, the government had decided to launch a major 
policy  initiative to  open  the Turkish economy and  expand manufacturing 
exports.  The real exchange rate  was  significantly devalued, which greatly 
enhanced the export profitability for Turkish manufacturing firms. A military 
government  seized  office  at  the  end  of  1980 and  continued  the  policy 
adjustments. Labor unrest was repressed, thereby preventing wage increases 
from undoing the real exchange rate depreciation. At the same time, Turkey 
was  fortunate  to  receive  substantial  financial  support  from  the  official 
creditor community. 
In  the  Philippines,  the  needed  adjustments were  not  put  in  place.  As 
Dohner and Intal indicate, the Marcos government attempted to counter the 
recessionary effects of  the  second oil price  increase by  increasing public 
expenditures. The government actually embarked on a new strategy of Major 
Industrial Projects in  1980, causing a significant rise in  the  public  sector 
deficit  and  a  significant acceleration  of  foreign  borrowing.  As  in  Latin 
America, the foreign debt nearly doubled between 1979 and  1982. 
In  the  four  Latin  American  countries,  there  is  not  a  single  case  of 
significant  retrenchment  during  1979-82.  Bolivia  was  in  no  condition 
politically to  embark on  a  stabilization effort.  In  the  tortuous  path  from 18  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
military government in 1978 to democratic government in 1982, there were 
no less than thirteen heads of  state! No government lasted long enough  to 
implement  a  stabilization  program,  and  only  one really  tried  (for a  short 
period in 1980). Bolivia fell into arrears with the commercial banks as early 
as  1980. In Argentina,  the political  situation  was also difficult.  The fixed 
exchange rate policy of  Martinez de Hoz, in place since late 1978, was still 
being defended in 1979-80  as the best hope for fighting inflation. By 1980, 
the sharply overvalued exchange rate was provoking enormous capital flight, 
but  the  exchange rate  was  not  devalued  until  February  1981. The  period 
between March  1981 and the advent of democratic rule at the end of 1983 
(with the accession to power of President Radl Alfonsin) was primarily one 
of  political  and  economic  disarray,  capped  by  Argentina’s  defeat  in  the 
Malvinas War in the spring of  1982. 
The policies  in  Brazil  stand in  interesting contrast to those in Korea.  In 
spring 1979, at about the same time that Korea embarked on its stabilization 
program,  Brazil  was  undergoing  a  presidential  succession,  from  Ernest0 
Geisel  to  Jog0  Baptista  Figueiredo.  The  new  planning  minister,  Mhrio 
Simonsen,  embarked  on  a  strategy  of  slower  growth,  reduced  budget 
deficits, and less reliance on foreign borrowing. But instead of persevering 
as  in  Korea,  these  austerity  measures  were  quickly  abandoned,  in  part 
paradoxically as a response to the rise of  oil prices in mid-1979. Rather than 
viewing the oil prices as yet another reason for retrenchment (as Brazil was a 
heavy oil exporter), the oil price increases were taken by many as a sign that 
new  “stimulative”  measures  were necessary.  In the event,  Simonsen was 
replaced  by  Ant8nio  Delfim  Neto,  who  quickly  ushered  in  a  policy  of 
accelerated foreign borrowing. 
Mexico  provides  a  particularly  remarkable  case  of  failure  to  adjust. 
Between  1979 and  198  1, the Mexican  public sector increased expenditures 
so dramatically that Mexico ended up in a foreign debt crisis in 1982 despite 
the historically unprecedented  boom in oil export earnings during 1980 and 
198 1. Government spending rose from 32.2 percent of GDP in 1979 to 46.4 
percent in  1981! This increase of  14 percent of GDP was accompanied by  a 
rise in revenues of  only 4 percent of GDP (from 26.2 to 30.1 percent). 
It is interesting to speculate on the deeper factors that might explain the 
Latin  American  (and  Philippine)  failure  to  pursue  more  realistic  fiscal 
policies. In another study, Andrew Berg and I (1988) surmised that the deep 
inequalities of  income in Latin America and the Philippines have probably 
been an important systematic factor in undermining a sound fiscal policy. We 
hypothesized that higher income inequality would have the following effects, 
all making budgetary control more difficult: 
.  raise the pressure for redistributive policies toward the poor and working 
.  enhance the power of economic elites to resist taxation; 
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decrease the political legitimacy of  governments that defend the existing 
contribute to direct labor militancy; 
more  generally, impede  the  development of  a  social consensus  around 
policies  that  promote  development  in  the  long  term,  but  which  might 
impose costs on some social groups in the short term. 
distribution of income; 
Berg and I offered some circumstantial evidence in support of our hypothesis 
by  showing that the extent of  income inequality in a sample of  thirty-four 
middle-income developing countries was a good predictor of which countries 
in the sample had succumbed to a debt crisis and which ones had not. 
3.  Macroeconomic Adjustments After the Onset of the Debt Crisis 
The previous section addressed the question of why  some countries fell 
into  crisis  and  others  did  not.  We  saw  that  the  differences  among  the 
countries  related  to  several  factors,  including  the  trade  regime  of  each 
country, the exchange rate policies, the fiscal management, and the reaction 
of the various countries to the external shocks of  1979-82.  In this section, I 
review  some  of  the  lessons  in  the  country  monographs  concerning  the 
macrodynamics of  a  debt  crisis,  starting  from  the  moment  that  foreign 
lending is cut off  to the overly indebted country. My  focus here is on the 
experience of the Latin American countries, which suffered the deepest debt 
crises, though I also mention the cases of Turkey and the Philippines. I also 
explore the reasons that recovery from the crisis has proved to be so difficult. 
In order to understand the economics of  a debt crisis,  it is important to 
review  the basic theory of  macroeconomic adjustment to external shocks. 
Consider,  for  purposes  of  discussion,  a  simple  economy  with  three 
productive  sectors:  a  primary  resource  sector  (e.g., oil,  grains,  primary 
metals), a tradables manufacturing sector, and a nontradables sector (which 
includes services,  construction,  and manufacturing that  operates behind  a 
high tariff barrier). The sectors will be denoted R, T, and N,  respectively. 
The economy imports final consumption goods, final investment goods, and 
imported intermediate goods used in domestic production of R, T, and N. 
The relative importance of  the three sectors in a particular economy will 
depend not only on the resource endowments of the economy, but also on the 
trade policies that have been pursued in the country over the preceding ten or 
twenty years. Outward-oriented trade policies will be more likely to result in 
a large tradables manufacturing sector, with significant levels of manufactur- 
ing exports, as in Korea.  Inward-looking policies will tend  to generate a 
manufacturing sector that is almost completely protected from world markets 
and is therefore really part of  the nontradables sector, as in Argentina. Of 
course, the size of the manufacturing export sector will also depend on factor 
endowments. Resource rich economies will tend, ceteris paribus, to have a 20  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
smaller manufacturing export sector since the export of primary commodi- 
ties  will  maintain  a  strong  exchange  rate,  which  will  crowd  out  the 
manufacturing export sector.29 
I  will  suppose  that  in  the  short run  of  the  production  of  the  primary 
commodity  R  is  inelastically  supplied,  while  production  in the  other two 
sectors is determined by production functions that use sector-specific capital, 
imported intermediate inputs, and labor. Labor can  move between the sectors 
in the short run (though perhaps with some adjustment lag). 
An appreciation of the real exchange rate (defined as a rise in the price of 
nontradables N  relative to tradables 7')  causes N  firms to bid  up wages and 
attract labor from the T sector. A rise in domestic aggregate demand (e.g., a 
fiscal expansion that is financed by foreign borrowing) pushes up demand for 
nontradables and  tradables.  Since the  supply and demand  for nontradables 
must be equal, the relative price of nontradables to tradables must rise (i.e., 
there must be a real appreciation), and labor is drawn from the T sector to the 
N  sector. 
The urban real wage will tend to rise with an exchange rate appreciation 
(i.e., a rise in the relative price on N) and to fall with a depreciation.  This 
will  be  true,  for  example,  when  the  nontradables  sector  is  relatively 
labor-intensive compared with the resource sector and the T sector is small 
(the  typical  pattern  in  the  Latin  American  countries).  If  there  is  a  large 
labor-intensive  tradables  sector  (as  in  Korea,  for example), the  negative 
effect of a real depreciation on the real wage will tend to be smaller than in 
the case of Latin America,  where the effect can be quite extreme.30 
Also,  the  responsiveness  of  exports  to  a given  percentage  fall  in  real 
wages will tend to be lower in Latin America than in Asia because in Latin 
America the main export sector is the resource sector, which has a very low 
short-run  supply  inelasticity,  while  the  more  responsive  T  sector  is  much 
smaller in Latin  America than in  Asia  as a percentage  of total  output.  For 
this reason, the extent to which real wages must decline in order to increase 
exports by  a given percentage of GDP will tend to be much larger in Latin 
America than in Asia. 
Exogenous  shocks  which  reduce  current  aggregate  expenditures  on 
nontradables will tend to cause a depreciation of the real exchange rate and 
consequently a decline in real wages. For example, a fall in the world price 
of  the  R  sector or a rise  in interest  costs for a net  debtor  both  lead  to  a 
negative income effect and a decline in demand for nontradables.  Similarly, 
in  a  case  where  foreign  borrowing  from international  capital  markets  is 
supporting  domestic  spending  above  domestic  production,  a cutoff  of  the 
foreign lending will cause a drop of absorption, with a consequent fall in the 
price of  nontradables  relative  to tradables  and  a decline  in  the  real  wage. 
Analogously,  a  country  that  is  financing  a  trade  deficit  by  running  down 
foreign exchange reserves will experience a collapse of absorption and a real 
exchange  rate  depreciation  at  the  moment  that  the  reserves  are  depleted 21  Introduction 
(assuming  that  there  is no recourse  to other forms  of  international capital 
inflow). 
This discussion highlights one central theme. The external shocks that hit 
the  NBER  countries  (a fall  in  the  terms  of  trade,  a rise  in  world  interest 
rates, and for five of the countries, a collapse of  international lending) were 
of  the  sort  that:  (1)  reduced  domestic  absorption;  (2)  provoked  a  real 
exchange  rate  depreciation;  and  (3)  thereby  provoked  a  decline  in  real 
wages.31 In  economies  with  a  very  small  T  sector  (such  as  Argentina, 
Bolivia, Mexico, and Turkey), the reduction of the real exchange rate and of 
the real wage had to be very large in order to induce a significant increase in 
the  supply  of  new  nontraditional  exports to compensate  for the  terms-of- 
trade decline in the R sector and for the higher interest rates and the cutoff of 
new funds from abroad. 
This discussion  of  adjustments  to  external  shocks, while  conventional, 
does not do justice to the real-world drama that lies behind the adjustment to 
external  shocks.  In  practice,  the  adjustment  to adverse  external  shocks  is 
likely to be politically destabilizing,  both because the shocks tend to require 
reductions  in  real  wages that  can  provoke  social  unrest  and  because  the 
shocks tend to require governments to adopt fiscal austerity measures that are 
politically unpopular and sometimes even threatening to the  survival of the 
government.  In  practice,  governments  may  have  very  grave  difficulties  in 
convincing the general public that the austerity is the result of external forces 
rather than domestic mismanagement. 
In  some  countries,  particularly  Argentina  and  Bolivia,  the  real  wage 
declines  that  followed  the  external  shocks  were  vigorously  resisted  by 
powerful labor groups and by political groups acting on the behalf of urban 
labor  interests.  In  these  countries,  the  external  shocks  have  provoked 
enormous  labor  unrest,  including  several  general  strikes  since  the  early 
1980s, as well  as the  periodic  application  of  wage  regulations  (such  as 
indexation  agreements)  that  attempt  to reduce  or eliminate  the  downward 
movement  of  the  real  wage.  The floor  on real  wage  adjustments  can  of 
course contribute to open unemployment or more likely to the growth of  an 
informal labor market, where the regulations are not honored and where real 
wages fall sharply. 
In other countries, especially in Brazil, Turkey, and Korea, which were all 
under military rule  in the period  1980-83,  real  wage resistance  was more 
readily  countered  by government  repression  of  labor unions  and pro-labor 
political parties.  32 In Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and Mexico, union activity 
is traditionally weak because of a long history of  government repression or 
co-optation. 
The second  kind  of  real-world  adjustment  difficulty  arises from the fact 
that the external shocks directly and adversely affect government  finances, 
thereby requiring politically painful  fiscal adjustments by  the governments. 
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trade  declines,  higher  world  interest  rates,  and  a  cutoff  in  new  lending. 
Governments  of  most  countries  in  the  NBER  project  rely  on  primary 
commodity exports  as a major source of  government revenues,33 so that a 
sharp drop in export earnings will cause a significant drop in government 
Even where taxes are levied on imports rather than exports, the 
decline  of  export  earnings  following  a  terms-of-trade  deterioration  can 
provoke a sharp drop in imports  and thereby a sharp drop in  government 
revenues.  35 
Similarly,  higher  world  interest  rates  directly  affected  the  government 
budget since much of the foreign debt was an obligation of the public sector: 
higher  world  interest  rates  coupled  with  the  heavy  stock  of  foreign  debt 
therefore contributed directly to an increase of  the budget deficit. For the 
same reason,  a cutoff in new  loans also affected the government directly, 
since the  lending cutoff  generally  affected loans to  the  public  sector and 
therefore  required  that  the  government  reduce  a  deficit  that  it  had  been 
financing with foreign loans or instead shift to other forms of  finance (often 
with dire consequences). 
The practical implications of  the link between government revenues and 
the external shocks are enormous. When the terms of trade deteriorates, or 
interest rates rise, or lending is cut off, there is not an automatic decline in 
domestic  spending  to  the  extent  that  these  shocks  hit  the  public  sector. 
Rather,  the  government  faces  an  explicit  policy  choice  of  absorbing the 
shock through  a combination of  reduced expenditures,  higher  taxes,  or a 
larger  budget  deficit.  The  effects  on  the  economy,  and  on  the  political 
fortunes of the government, are closely linked to the choices that it makes. 
The “textbook”  approach to a permanent adverse shock, such as a lower 
terms of  trade or higher interest costs,  is to  cut spending and raise taxes 
sufficiently to absorb the shortfall in government revenues.  The “optimal” 
response to a cutoff in the availability of  foreign credits is in general more 
complicated,  though  it  will  typically  involve  a  reduction  in  overall 
borrowing,  as well as  a partial  shift in financing from  foreign sources to 
domestic  sources.  Typically,  the  necessary  austerity  measures  are  very 
difficult to  carry  out  politically.  When  the  government  imposes austerity 
measures after a terms-of-trade shock or an interest rate increase, political 
opponents of  the government will try to blame the economic hardships on 
government  mismanagement  rather  than  on  the  exogenous  shocks  them- 
selves,  and  they  will  often  enjoy  significant  political  success  with  this 
gambit. This possibility alone will lead governments to try to postpone and 
disguise the necessary adjustments as long as possible. 
Moreover, many governments simply do not have the power to implement 
an austerity program, even if  they want to. Large parts of the public sector 
(e.g., state enterprises, local and regional governments) may be outside of 
the  effective  control  of  the  finance minister.  And  even  if  the  executive 
branch formulates  a realistic  adjustment effort,  it  may  be  frustrated by  a 23  Introduction 
recalcitrant  legislature  (especially  if  controlled  by  an  opposing  political 
party) which refuses to support the executive's  measures.36 The government 
may  therefore choose,  or be forced, to absorb much of  the shock through 
increased borrowing.  37  Eventually, the creditworthiness for borrowing will 
erode,  finally  forcing  the  government  into  inflationary finance  if  it  still 
cannot engineer a cut in spending or a rise in taxes. 
If we examine the actual path of adjustments taken in response to external 
shocks, certain salient trends are evident. In Latin America, where the foreign 
credit  squeeze  was  most  severe,  governments  responded  to  the  external 
shocks with a combination of spending cuts and increased domestic borrow- 
ing. In cutting spending, public investment projects were the first to go, public 
sector real wages the second, and public sector employment a distant third. 
The decline in foreign loans and the large budget deficits after 1981 led to 
a  shift  toward  domestic  financing.  That  financing  was  in  turn  divided 
between  financing from  the  central  bank  (i.e.,  seignorage financing) and 
financing from the domestic capital markets. Of course, increased domestic 
borrowing  contributed  to  a  crowding  out  of  private  inve~tment.~~  Since 
private  investment  was  also  crowded  out  by  the  increased  public  sector 
deficits, the combination of a lower public sector investment rate and a lower 
private sector investment rate led to a sharp drop in total investment rate in 
the economy, as a percentage of GDP, as shown in table 12. 
Between  1982  and  1986,  the  governments  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  and 
Mexico borrowed heavily  in the domestic capital markets,  thereby raising 
sharply the stock of  domestic public debt as a share of  GNP. By  1988, the 
interest  burden  on  the  internal  debt  rivalled  the  interest  burden  on  the 
external debt in Brazil and Mexico. In Bolivia, the government lacked even 
the creditworthiness to borrow from the internal capital markets, so that the 
decline in foreign lending was matched, almost one-for-one, by  an increase 
Table 12  Rate of Gross Capital Formation as Percentage of GDP, 1978-86 
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in central bank  credits to the government.  As pointed out by Juan Antonio 
Morales  and  myself  (in  this  vol.),  this  shift from foreign  financing of  the 
government deficit before 1980 to central bank financing after 1982 was the 
proximate cause of the Bolivian hyperinflation  during 1984-85. 
The large internal borrowing  in Argentina,  Brazil,  and Mexico, with the 
attendant upward pressure on domestic real  interest rates, led to increasing 
reliance  over  time  on  central  bank  financing  of  the  budget  deficits. 
Eventually,  the  central  bank  financing  resulted  in  a  sharp  increase  in 
domestic inflation.  To summarize, large budget deficits during the pre-1982 
period  had  modest  effects on inflation  since they were financed  heavily by 
foreign borrowing,  with a pegged exchange rate that kept domestic inflation 
low. After the foreign credits dried up and the budget deficits worsened after 
1982, inflation  began  to increase.  The increasing  recourse  to central  bank 
financing in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico between  1982 and  1985 
then  contributed  to  the  outbreak  of  very  high  inflation,  reaching  a  true 
hyperinflation  in  Bolivia  during  1984-85  and  more  than  1,000 percent 
annual inflation in Brazil in  1988. 
4.  The Difficulty of Economic Stabilization 
Six of the countries in the NBER project experienced a serious debt crisis: 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  and  Turkey.  Some 
evidence on the successes and failures of stabilization after the debt crisis are 
given in table  13. For  each country,  I  summarize the growth  and  inflation 
performance  of  the  economy  in  the  years  following  the  onset  of  the  debt 
crisis. It is clear that only Turkey has been able to resume sustained growth 
after the crisis, though as of  1988, the Philippines was also showing signs of 
a possible return to sustained growth with low inflation. 
All  of  the  countries  except  the  Philippines  have  had  great  difficulties 
in  controlling  inflation.  Turkey’s  inflation  has  been  in  the  high  double- 
digit  rates,  while  inflation  in  Latin  America  has  been  at triple-digit  rates 
and higher. As of the end of  1988, it appeared that Bolivia and Mexico had 
been  able to end  their high  inflations  through  programs  of  fiscal  austerity, 
while Argentina and Brazil appeared to be on the verge of  hyperinflation. 
One of  the  deepest  puzzles  in the  debt crisis  has  been  the  difficulty  of 
sustaining economic  stabilization and growth, with the partial  exception of 
Turkey. The Turkish recovery in growth in the 1980s is explained by Cel2sun 
and Rodrik by  several factors: (1) the generous foreign support received  by 
Turkey during  1979-82  from official  creditors; (2) the shift toward export 
promotion  in  1980,  backed  up  by  trade  reforms  and  a  significant  real 
depreciation  with  a  real  wage  cut;  (3)  special  factors,  like  the  boom  in 
exports to the Middle East following the outbreak of  the Iran-Iraq war; and 
(4)  the  fact  that  Turkey’s  external  debt  burden  was  never  as  great,  as a 
percentage of GNP, as in the Latin American countries. 25  Introduction 
Table 13  Recent Economic Performance: GDP Growth and Inflation 
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I have already indicated some of the reasons for the great difficulties in 
recovery in the Latin American countries, but they bear reiterating: 
1. The external shocks required a sharp reduction in real wage levels, which 
proved to be politically destabilizing in several countries; 
2. The  external  shocks  provoked  a  significant  worsening  of  the  budget 
deficit, as well as a reduced ability to finance the deficit from abroad. The 
fiscal  crisis  in  turn  prompted  sharp  cuts  in  public  investment  and 
increased domestic borrowing by the central government.  The domestic 
financing  of  the  deficit  has  led  to  a  partial  crowding  out  of  private 
investment  and  a  sharp  increase  in  inflationary  finance by  the  central 
bank; 
3. The sharp reduction in aggregate investment rates has led to a significant 
reduction in the potential growth rates of the economy; 
4.  The  sharp  rise  in  inflation  has  undermined  political  and  economic 
stability and has undermined private sector confidence to invest in new 
export sectors. 26  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
The experiences of Argentina and Brazil in attempting to use wage-price 
controls as  part  of  an  anti-inflation effort are  illuminating. The  so-called 
heterodox shock programs, known as the Austral Plan in Argentina and the 
Cruzado  Plan  in  Brazil,  are  discussed,  respectively,  in  detail  in  the 
monographs by Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo and by Eliana 
Cardoso and Albert Fishlow (in this vol.). The theory of the heterodox shock 
was  the  same  in  both  countries: since inflation has  an  important  inertial 
component, it is important to complement the orthodox measures of  tight 
monetary  and  fiscal policy  with  an  incomes policy designed to break  the 
wage-price inertia.39 In the event, both countries carried out the heterodox 
elements but  fell  short on  the  more  orthodox  elements,  i.e.,  the  budget 
deficits remained excessively large.  After a short period of  price stabiliza- 
tion, high inflation resumed in both countries. 
It  is  important  to  underline  three  additional features  of  the  economic 
environment that have hindered a strong recovery  in Latin America. I put 
these  factors  under  the  heading  of  the  “political  economy  of  the  Latin 
American debt overhang.”  The first factor is the political weakness of  the 
Latin  American  governments. In Argentina,  Bolivia,  and  Brazil, the debt 
crisis  coincided  with  the  transition  of  democratic  rule  after  almost  two 
decades  of  military  government.  The  new  democracies  were  fragile, 
untested, and inexperienced, and subject to the pent-up social demands of a 
population that had been politically repressed for years. Populist sentiments 
to  increase wages  and  social spending took  hold just  at the moment  that 
budget austerity and real wage cuts were needed. Even in Mexico, where the 
PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) has dominated the political scene for 
decades, the political control of the government has been waning for years, 
thus limiting the possibilities for strong austerity rnea~ures.~’ 
The second factor is the particular problem of implementing austerity and 
reform programs in response to  an external debt crisis.  I  have noted  that 
interest servicing of the foreign debt now constitutes a large fraction of public 
expenditure in all of the Latin American countries (as well as in Indonesia and 
the  Philippines).  Budget  austerity  measures  and  other  kinds  of  reform 
measures (e.g., trade liberalization measures) are viewed by  the citizens of 
these countries as a squeeze on living standards that is undertaken  for the sake 
of  foreign creditors. Since the foreign debt has little public legitimacy in the 
first place (particularly in South America where it was accumulated during the 
1970s, mostly under repressive military regimes), there is little popularity in 
belt-tightening for the sake of repaying the foreign debt. Increasingly during 
1982-88, the issue of whether to suspend debt payments has become a central 
topic  of  political  debate.  Governments  that  urge  austerity  programs  are 
increasingly subject to rejection by  a frustrated electorate that is attracted to 
the option of suspending foreign debt  payment^.^' 
The third factor is the set of economic inefficiencies that arise from a large 
overhang  of  debt.42 Countries  with  a  large  overhang  of  debt  face  the 27  Introduction 
following  kinds  of  difficulties:  sanctions  from  disgruntled  creditors  for 
incomplete payments on old debts (e.g., withdrawals of  trade credits); high 
bargaining costs  in  renegotiating the  old  debt,  including repeated break- 
downs in  financial relations between the government and  its  creditors; an 
inability to borrow for new  investment projects, even when those projects 
have a high rate of return; and, as already mentioned, adverse incentives for 
carrying out  austerity and reform programs  since the  costs of  reform  are 
borne by the debtor country while the benefits of reform will be appropriated 
by  the foreign creditors. 
Debt Renegotiations After the Onset of the Debt Crisis 
In each of  the six countries that succumbed to the debt crisis (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, and Turkey), the country abruptly 
lost access to international lending after the international banks deemed the 
country  to  be  uncreditworthy.  In  all  cases,  the  contractual  schedule  of 
debt-servicing obligations faced by  the country after the onset of  the crisis 
could no longer be met, in part because the country had been relying on new 
lending to  help finance the  debt-service payments that  were  coming due. 
This was especially true for amortization payments, for which the normal 
expectation was that they would be refinanced through new loans. Once the 
debt crisis hit, even the refinancing of amortization payments became highly 
problematic. 
As a result, there has been a sustained period of renegotiation of the debt 
since the onset of the crisis. Only Turkey has “graduated”  from the process 
of renegotiation to renewed access to market borrowing. For the other five 
countries,  the  renegotiation  process  has  been  nearly  continuous  for  five 
years,  with  little  prospect  in  sight  for  a  resumption  of  normal  market 
conditions for these countries. As I noted in table 3, the secondary market 
value of the commercial bank debt of  the five countries remains far below 
par, indicating a lack of faith that the old loans will be fully repaid. Thus, the 
banks have little desire to resume normal market lending to these countries. 
The  nature  of  the  debt  renegotiations has  been  widely  discussed  and 
analyzed, and a summary of the process may be found in my introduction to 
volume 1.43  The basic structure of negotiations was designed by  the creditor 
governments, mainly the U.S., working in conjunction with the commercial 
banks and the international financial institutions. The Mexican renegotiations 
of  1982-83  set  the  basic  pattern  for  almost  all  of  the  negotiations that 
followed. 
In  a  nutshell,  the  negotiating  process  has  contained  the  following 
elements: (1)  a long-term rescheduling of  all principal due on medium- and 
long-term debt  owed  to  commercial banks;  (2)  a  commitment by  debtor 
countries to remain current on interest payments due on the debt; (3) in some 
years, a partial refinancing of interest payments through the mechanism of a 
“concerted  loan,”  in  which  the  bank  creditors agree jointly  to  re-lend  a 28  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
portion of  the interest that is due; (4) a long-term rescheduling of  bilateral 
debt-service payments, both principal and interest, in the Paris Club forum; 
(5)  an  IMF  standby  program,  with  conditionality  focussing  on  budget 
austerity and export promotion via exchange rate depreciation; and (6) new 
lending  from  official  sources,  including  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank,  the 
multilateral  development  banks,  and  the  export  credit  agencies  of  the 
industrial countries. 
Because of the creditor governments’ concerns with the financial situation 
of  the commercial banks that were heavily exposed in the debtor countries, 
the official policy has been to press for continued interest servicing of  the 
debt and to oppose any significant element of debt reduction in the course of 
the negotiations between the debtors and the banks. Thus, even as evidence 
has grown after 1982 that much of the debt may not be repayable, at least if 
economic and political stability is to be maintained in the debtor countries, 
the negotiations have not led to any significant long-term reduction in  the 
debt burden, with the notable exception of  Bolivia. 
Unlike Turkey, which received  substantial credits after  1979 (enough to 
eliminate  the  net  resource  transfer  from  the  Turkish  government  to  its 
creditors), none of  the Latin governments has been afforded a comparable 
financial “time-out”  on debt servicing. Every year, the Latin governments 
have  made  large  net  resource  transfers to  the  foreign  creditors (equal to 
several percent of GNP each year). Only Bolivia has been able to reverse the 
negative resource transfers after 1985, through its policy of suspending debt 
payments  to the commercial banks  while at the  same time receiving new 
credits from the official creditor community. 
The NBER monographs make clear the high costs of  a strategy that has 
continued to  insist  on  full  interest  servicing of  the  bank  debt.  Relations 
between  the  creditor  banks  and  the  debtor  governments  have  become 
increasingly turbulent and  unstable since  1982.  Negotiations between  the 
governments and  the  banks  are  drawn-out  cliffhangers,  and  the  hardline 
positions  of  the  creditors  and  the  debtors  have  often  pushed  financial 
relations to  the  verge  of  rupture  or  beyond  (as  with  the  moratorium  of 
debt-service payments by Brazil during 1987, the suspension of payments by 
Bolivia after 1984, and the deep arrears of  Argentina in  1988). 
Since the IMF has designed standby programs based on the presumption 
that the interest on the debt can and will be fully serviced, the conditions of 
these programs have  repeatedly failed  to  be  met  by  the  Latin  American 
countries. As Cardoso and Fishlow recall, “successive letters of intent under 
IMF programs had no sooner been dispatched than they were made obsolete 
by  accelerating inflation that did violence to the monetary targets.’ ’ Brazil 
signed and then subsequently failed to meet the conditions of  no less than 
eight standby arrangements during  1983-85.  Similarly, Argentina entered 
and then failed to comply with several IMF programs from 1986 to  1988. 
The failure to the economies in  the debtor countries to recover has  led 
more  and  more  market  participants  to  expect that  the  debts  of  the  Latin 29  Introduction 
American countries will eventually be reduced, either through a negotiated 
settlement  or  unilateral  action.  (As  Lindert  and  Morton,  Sachs,  and 
Eichengreen stress in volume 1, debt reductions have been the normal mode 
of  resolving debt crisis in past historical episodes.) 
The unusual case of  Bolivia provides some support for the argument that 
debt reduction may bring benefits both to the creditor and debtor.44 For  a 
variety of  economic and foreign policy reasons, the U.S. government and 
the rest of  the official creditor community began after 1985 to support the 
concept of  debt reduction for Bolivia.  Morales and  Sachs argue that  this 
more lenient attitude on the debt was crucial in allowing Bolivia (alone of 
the  high-inflation  countries  in  the  region)  to  end  the  hyperinflation  of 
1984-85  and to restore stability and renewed economic growth. 
During  1986-88,  the  official  community  supported  Bolivia  with  new 
credits despite Bolivia’s policy of nonpayment of  interest to the banks.45 At 
the same time, the official community supported Bolivia’s negotiations with 
the  banks  aimed  at  allowing  Bolivia to  use  donated funds from  friendly 
governments  to  repurchase  part  of  its  debt  at  the  deeply  discounted 
secondary  market  price  (of  11 cents  per  dollar  of  face  value).  In  1988, 
Bolivia  repurchased  approximately  one-half  its  debt  from  the  banks. 
Subsequently, Bolivia  and  the  banks  have  entered  into  a  new  round  of 
negotiations to reduce the burden of  the remaining debt. 
It would appear that the creditor banks have benefitted from the buyback 
along with Bolivia. Before the buyback, Bolivia was in complete suspension 
of debt payments and the secondary market price of Bolivia’s debt had fallen 
to 5 cents on the dollar. The buyback raised the secondary market value to 
11 percent and  allowed the banks  to  sell half  of  the debt for cash at this 
price. Bolivia surely benefitted from the lenient treatment on the debt, not 
only in the trivial sense of  saving money on future debt servicing, but also in 
the  sense of  bolstering the  political case  for  a  strong domestic austerity 
program, which could no longer be attacked as a measure undertaken for the 
sake of the foreign creditors. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The NBER monographs were prepared to shed light on several important 
questions  regarding  foreign  borrowing  and  the  developing  country  debt 
crisis. Why did the crisis occur? Why did it hit some countries deeply and 
not others? What are the economic mechanisms involved in an external debt 
crisis,  and  why  is recovery  so difficult? How  might the process of  debt 
negotiations be altered to enhance the recovery of the debtor countries? 
The monographs are very rich in insights on these points, and this essay 
could  do  no  more  than  touch  the  surface  of  the  individual  country 
experiences.  Nonetheless, the  country  experiences do lend  themselves to 
certain  general conclusions,  and  it  is  worthwhile  to  restate  these  at  this 
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First,  while  the  debt  crisis  was  provoked  by  important  shocks  in  the 
international economy  (mainly  the  rise  in  interest  rates  and  the  fall  in 
primary commodities prices), the effects of  these shocks on the individual 
debtor economies depended importantly on the quality of economic policies 
that were in place in the debtor economies. Countries with a sound long-term 
growth  strategy,  based  on  an  outward-oriented  trade  regime,  realistic 
exchange rates, and prudent fiscal policies, were well equipped to cope with 
the external shocks. 
Moreover, even after the shocks hit at the end of the 1970s, there was still 
time for a reorientation of  policies by  the debtor countries. Most countries 
(and especially those in Latin America) lost this opportunity to get policies 
under control; many other countries, such as Indonesia, Korea, and Turkey, 
underwent  significant adjustment efforts,  which  helped  them  to  avoid the 
worst of the crisis. 
The debt crisis, when it hit, showed a similar mechanism in the countries 
that fell into crisis. In the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, the 
Philippines, and Turkey, the onset of  the debt crisis is marked by an abrupt 
withdrawal of new credits form the world capital markets and an inability to 
roll over existing debts on a normal basis. This shock is typically combined 
with (and indeed precipitated by) a terms-of-trade deterioration or a rise in 
interest rates that puts additional burdens on the debtor country. 
Proper adjustments to these shocks typically require a real exchange rate 
depreciation (i.e., a rise in the price of tradables to nontradables, a reduction 
of  the  urban  real  wage,  a  shrinkage  of  the  nontradables  sector  and  an 
expansion of  the tradables sector, and a program of  fiscal austerity. These 
adjustments  can  well  be  traumatic,  both  economically  and  politically, 
especially in  economies that  are  particularly  inflexible  because of  a  past 
history of  inward-oriented trade policies. If  the nontraditional export sector 
is especially small, then a very large real exchange rate depreciation and a 
large  fall  in  the  real  wage  might be  needed  in  order  to  restore external 
equilibrium.  The  process  of  reducing  the  real  wage  can  provoke  social 
unrest. It is notable that this process led to more open conflict in countries 
with  militant trade unions  (e.g.,  Argentina and Bolivia), than in countries 
that  relied  on  repression of  trade  unions  to  restrict  labor demands (e.g., 
Korea and Turkey in the early 1980s). 
The reduction of the budget deficit after the onset of  the debt crisis also 
proved to be difficult and politically destabilizing in many countries. In part 
this is because governments simply wanted to avoid the opprobrium from 
pursuing an  unpopular austerity program.  In  other cases,  the government 
faced  opposition  in  the  legislature  to  austerity  measures  (such  as  tax 
increases  or  layoffs  in  the  public  sector)  and  thus  was  blocked  from 
implementing an  austerity plan.  Also,  the executive branch typically lacks 
the  power  to  make  a comprehensive fiscal adjustment since many of  the 
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and  in  regional and local governments, which are beyond the reach of  the 
finance minister. These units often have independent access to central bank 
financing that is outside of  the budget. Moreover, these entities often have a 
powerful political voice, which allows them to resist calls for austerity. 
Fiscal adjustments in the response to a debt crisis are particularly tricky 
from a political point of  view, since the public comes to view the austerity 
measures as being put in place for the sake of foreign creditors, rather than 
domestic residents. In the Latin American countries and in the Philippines, 
there  is  a  growing political  current  which  therefore rejects  the  austerity 
measures in  favor  of  a  unilateral  suspension of  payments to  the  foreign 
creditors. 
The country monographs reveal only spotty success in restoring stability 
and  growth  after the  onset  of  a  debt  crisis.  Turkey  has  been  the  most 
successful case, for it has not only restored economic growth but has also 
restored its access to the international capital markets. But even in this most 
successful case, the inflation rate has remained extremely high (nearly  100 
percent  per  year  in  1988),  so  that  macroeconomic  stability remains  in 
question. In  the  Latin American countries, there has been  no  successful 
revival of growth, and as of  1988, Argentina and Brazil continued to face the 
possibility of hyperinflation. Mexico reached triple-digit inflation in  1987, 
but  apparently reduced  it  in  1988  at  the  cost of  another year  of  output 
decline. Bolivia was  able to end  a hyperinflation in  1986 and  to resume 
slight positive growth in  1987, but  only in the context of  a program that 
included a complete suspension of  payments on commercial bank debt. 
The  longer  term  prospects  remain  grim  for  many  of  the  countries. 
Following the crisis, aggregate investment rates are down sharply in the four 
Latin American countries, as well as in the Philippines, so that the long-term 
growth  potential  has  been  diminished  in  recent  years.  Moreover,  these 
countries seem to have little prospect of a quick return to the international 
capital markets in view of the market assessments that much of the existing 
debt  will  not  be  serviced  in  the  long  run.46 I  noted  several  possible 
inefficiencies that may  result from the large overhang of  bad  debt. These 
inefficiencies include the  costs of repeated  breakdowns in  debtor-creditor 
relations; the withdrawal of  trade credits and new lending to the countries, 
even  when  highly  profitable new  investment opportunities exist; and  the 
disincentive for the debtor to undertake costly reform efforts, if  the benefits 
of those reforms are likely to flow to the creditors in the form of  increased 
debt-service payments. 
For these reasons, many of the authors speculated about the possible need 
to reduce the debt burden in the future and to abandon the presumption that 
all of  the debt should eventually be repaid. The studies provide only one 
illustration of  actual debt reduction, the case of  Bolivia, but  the evidence 
suggests that in  that case, debt reduction has in fact worked to the mutual 
benefit of the creditors and the debtor country. 32  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Notes 
1.  For  several  studies  of  Latin  America  in  the  1930s,  see  Thorp  (1984).  A 
particularly good survey of the period is provided by Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro in the 
same volume. These essays show that despite the enormous collapse of commodities 
prices in the Great Depression,  many primary commodities producers experienced a 
vigorous recovery, particularly in agriculture and import-competing manufacturing. 
2.  In Bolivia, for example, real per capita GDP in 1988 was at the same level as in 
1955. In Peru, the real per capita GDP in 1987 was as the same level as in  1960. 
3.  The debt crisis is generally dated to August 1982, when Mexico announced that 
it would be unable to meet its debt-servicing obligations. Soon thereafter, there was a 
cascade of  similar announcements. It is true, however, that several countries fell into 
external crisis before Mexico.  Of  the countries in the NBER study, Turkey’s crisis 
arrived at the end of the  1970s, Bolivia fell into debt crisis in  1981, and Argentina 
fell into crisis in the spring of  1982. 
4.  Even Colombia, which did not reschedule its debts after  1982, found it to be 
impossible to get normal  market  loans  to roll  over principal  falling  due in  1988. 
Chile,  which  is  widely  considered  by  the  financial  markets  to  have  been  the 
best-managed of the South American countries, is still without access to spontaneous 
new lending from the banking world. 
5.  There  are  differences  in  the  nature  of  the  debt  crisis  in  the  poor  versus 
middle-income countries because of the much less important role of bank debt in the 
case of  the low-income countries. Thus, while this study inevitably sheds some light 
on the poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the relative importance of commercial 
bank debt in Latin America leads to special characteristics of the adjustment process 
and debt-renegotiation patterns in Latin America as compared with Africa. One major 
difference is that official creditors did not withdraw net lending as abruptly as did the 
commercial banks, so that there was not a decisive shift from net resource inflows to 
net resource outflows in the low-income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa as there was 
in the middle-income countries of Latin America. The second difference has been the 
greater effective debt relief offered by the official creditors than by the commercial 
banks.  The Paris Club of government creditors, for example, routinely reschedules 
nearly 100 percent of interest payments due, while the commercial banks have never 
rescheduled interest payments. 
6. Bolivia experienced the sharpest measured decline in per capita income during 
1980-85  (-28  percent),  as  well  as  the  worst  hyperinflation  in  Latin  American 
history (24,000 percent from August 1984 to August 1985). Peru, with hyperinflation 
beginning in 1988, appears to be the leading candidate for the worst crisis during the 
second half of the  1980s. 
7. In practice, most of the debt is in fact the liability of a public sector entity. 
8. Between  1980 and  1986, the  proportion  of  total  external  debt  owed  by  the 
public sector tended to rise significantly in the heavily indebted countries. According 
to the World Bank’s Debt Tables (1988-89  edition), the overall  1980 long-term debt 
of the heavily indebted countries was $205 billion, of which $148 billion was public 
or publicly guaranteed debt. Thus, in 1980, about 72 percent of the debt was owed by 
the public sector. By  1986, the total debt had risen to $421 billion,  of which $360 
billion, or 86 percent, was now owed by the public sector. One reason for the rise in 33  Introduction 
this ratio has already been mentioned in the text: private sector firms made individual 
arrangements  with  their  creditors  to  reduce  the  debt  through  various  kinds  of 
workouts. This is generally easier than with public debt, for several reasons: (1) the 
private debtors usually have only a small number of foreign creditors; (2) the private 
debt can be negotiated outside of  the glare of  publicity; deals can be made without 
fear that they will act as precedents for other debtors; (3) concerted lending packages 
have been available mainly to public sector debtors; and (4)  some parts of the private 
sector debt have been absorbed by the public sector, through various kinds of bailout 
programs for private sector firms. 
9. Also,  the availability of official credits  will depend  on  various noneconomic 
factors,  such as the military/strategic importance of the country. As  Merih CelPsun 
and Dani Rodrik  point  out in  volume  3, the  strategic  importance of  Turkey as  a 
frontline  member  of  NATO  contributed  to  the  large  inflows of  official credits  to 
Turkey after the onset of Turkey’s financial crisis toward the end of the 1970s. 
10. It may also seem to impute too much  irrationality to market participants  to 
suggest that they believed in a Ponzi scheme during the 1970s. Didn’t they know that 
such a good thing was bound to end once real interest rates rose back to more normal 
levels? The answer seems to be that many market participants and observers simply 
extrapolated the heady  successes of  the  1970s well into the  future.  And for many 
market participants, the incentives were such that there were few concerns about the 
far distant future. Within many debtor countries, the expected tenure in office of a 
particular  government  was  too  short  to worry  about  the  long-run  constraints  on 
borrowing.  Even more  surprising,  the same was true within many large banks.  As 
described in a recent history of  Bank of America (Hector  1988), the lending at the 
bank in the mid- and late  1970s was judged  according to the growth of earnings, 
rather than on the quality of the loan portfolio. Of course, the earnings on a loan in a 
particular year depended only on whether the loan was being serviced that year (even 
if  out of borrowed money) and not on an assessment of  the true long-term value of 
the  loan.  Hector  describes  the  frenetic  atmosphere  at  the  bank  and  at  competitor 
banks as follows: 
By  1977, as Clausen [the bank president] strove to keep quarterly profits climbing, 
the  10 percent  a  year  growth  limit  fell  to  demands  from  the  head  office.  Tom 
Clausen wanted  to restore  Bank of  America to its rightful place  as the  nation’s 
most profitable bank.  He pushed  lenders  to  increase loans  rapidly,  even though 
Bank of America was running at the limits of its ability to control its growth. . . . 
Managers learned quickly that headquarters  always  wanted more growth than 
they could supply . . . [Lloan officers realized that they were better off adding a 
pile of new loans of dubious quality than adding too few loans. The head office 
didn’t differentiate between the good and bad loans of its budget reviews, and a 
loan officer’s salary increases and promotions depended on only two variables: the 
size of his loan portfolio and the number of people working for his unit.  (89) 
11. For the conclusion that the size of external shocks (both on commodities prices 
and interest rates) cannot account for cross-country differences in performance in the 
1980s, see also my papers, Sachs 1985, and Berg and Sachs (1988). 
12. For an authoritative  statement in support of  outward-oriented trade regimes, 
see Krueger (1978). See also various studies by  Bela Balassa,  such as Balassa and 
Associates (1982). 
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13. Detailed  descriptions  of  the  trade  strategies  may  be  found  in  each  of  the 
country monographs. 
14. Brecher and Diaz Alejandro proved that foreign borrowing at market interest 
rates must be welfare-worsening  for a competitive economy operating with  a tariff 
bamer for the import-competing  sector. The tariff results in an excessive allocation 
of  resources  to the  protected  sector. The shadow value  of  capital  in  this  sector is 
necessarily  less  than  the  world  cost  of  capital,  meaning  that  national  income  is 
reduced overall  by  the foreign borrowing  once repayment  on the  foreign capital is 
taken into account. This misallocation caused by a high tariff barrier can in fact be so 
severe that  national  income is reduced  by  an  inflow of  foreign  capital  even  if  the 
foreign  capital  is  a  gift  rather  than  a  loan,  a  point  first  made  by  Harry  Johnson 
(1967).  The  inflow  of  foreign  capital  reduces  income  by  further  encouraging  the 
buildup of  the  high-cost  protected  sector and reducing the production  of the more 
efficient export sector. 
15.  Among the Latin American countries, Brazil has shown the greatest capacity 
to  spur new  nontraditional  exports.  This  is in  line with  Brazil’s export-promotion 
policies during much of  the  1970s. According to many observers, including Eliana 
Cardoso  and  Albert  Fishlow  (in  this  vol.),  the  Brazilian  trading  system  became 
increasingly inward-oriented in the mid- 1970s and afterward. Following substantial 
trade  liberalization  after  1985,  Mexico  has  also  enjoyed  a  mini-boom  in  manu- 
facturing exports.  The export growth has been very rapid, but starting from a very 
small base. 
16. In some cases, where foreign exchange was rationed after the terms-of-trade 
decline  and the  onset of  the debt crisis, the  manufacturing  firms simply could  not 
obtain  the  necessary  inputs,  or only  on  the black  market  with  a very  depreciated 
exchange rate. In other cases, the exchange rate was devalued sharply so that the cost 
of the inputs rose sharply relative to wages and relative to nontradables in general. 
17. In  Argentina,  Bolivia,  and  Brazil,  the  exchange  rate  has  sometimes  been 
maintained, even after reserves dry up, through the use of foreign exchange rationing 
and exchange controls. A black market exchange rate inevitably develops, which is 
sharply depreciated relative to the official rate. As is well known, the spread between 
the official rate, at which exporters must surrender foreign exchange, and the black 
market rate, which determines the marginal cost of imports, acts like an implicit tax 
on the  export sector. The spread between the  black  market exchange  rate  and the 
official rate reached several hundred percent in Bolivia during  1984 and  1985, and 
has  frequently  been  on  the  order  of  30-50  percent  in  Argentina  and  Brazil.  For 
further evidence on the existence  of  higher black market premia  in Latin  America 
than in East Asia, see Sachs (1985, 541, table 6). 
18. Note  that  as  with  trade  policy,  Brazil  comes  across  as  somewhat  more 
outward-oriented than do the other Latin American countries. 
19. Interestingly, observers in Mexico have recently noted a growing constituency 
for devaluation  among the  new manufacturing exporters who have arisen with the 
liberalization-with-real-exchange-rate-depreciation  since 1985. 
20.  Argentina and Mexico were particularly susceptible to capital flight because of 
the  absence  of  capital  controls  (Argentina,  unwisely,  had  eliminated  most  capital 
controls during 1977-78). 
21.  The definition and measurement of capital flight are fraught with conceptual 
and  data  problems.  What  should  be  counted  as  capital  flight? All  private  capital 
flows abroad? Only those that are unreported?  Only those  that are prompted  by  a 35  Introduction 
specific motivation,  such as tax evasion or to avoid political unrest? The definition 
used in table  11 is one that was proposed by  Morgan Guaranty. It defines capital 
flight as all private  sector capital  outflows except those  that  are  intermediated  by 
the domestic  banking  system  and  except those  that  are recorded  as  foreign direct 
investment.  Other  definitions,  equally plausible,  also show the  same pattern as in 
the table. 
22.  Apparently, ’hrkey  also avoided extensive capital  flight, though  the  studies 
reported in table 11 did not include Turkey in the countries examined. 
23.  Despite perfectly open capital markets, Indonesia has apparently been able to 
avoid rampant capital flight through the maintenance of a realistic exchange rate and 
prudent fiscal policy. 
24.  In  some  cases,  however,  the  government  is  a  net  importer  of  goods  and 
services (e.g.,  in Brazil,  where the  government  services foreign debt  and imports 
oil). Then, as Cardoso and Fishlow stress, a real appreciation can actually reduce a 
budget deficit and a real depreciation can worsen a deficit. In Brazil, for example, a 
real  depreciation  raises  the  domestic  resource  cost  of  servicing  the  foreign  debt, 
which is not offset by higher earnings of public sector export firms. 
25.  Actually, the share of  debt in the public sector increased after the onset of the 
debt crisis since much of the private sector debt was taken over by the government in 
the course of various bailout operations for private sector firms. Even before the debt 
crisis hit, however, the share of  public sector debt in the total debt has always been 
more than half in all of the countries in the NBER project. 
26.  Among other factors, the regime  is interested  in  reducing discontent  in the 
heavily agricultural Outer Islands. 
27. Of  course,  Mexico  had  already  experienced  one near-disaster  with  foreign 
borrowing in 1976, and Indonesia had been shaken by the Pertamina crisis of  1975, 
but those cases were viewed as special, isolated problems.  The Mexican crisis was 
viewed  more  as  a  problem  of  exchange  rate  mismanagement  (pegging  to  an 
unrealistic value of the peso), rather than as a foreign debt crisis. 
28.  The net debt here is defined as the total liabilities owed by  residents of the 
country (public plus private sector) to commercial banks in the BIS reporting  area, 
minus claims of residents on BIS-area banks. In Argentina,  the net debt went from 
$5.3 billion at the end of 1979 to $16.3 billion at the end of  1981; in Brazil, the debt 
rose from $28.8 billion to 44.8 billion; and in Mexico, the debt increased from $22.5 
billion to $43.4 billion.  For the three countries, the net debt increased by 85 percent 
in just two years. 
29. This is the  phenomenon  known  as the  “Dutch  disease”:  a strong resource 
sector  crowds  out  other  tradables  sectors  and  promotes  the  expansion  of  the 
nontradables sector. 
30. The real wage could actually rise with an exchange rate depreciation in the 
unlikely case of a very large T sector that is labor intensive relative to the N sector. 
31.  Actually, in Korea, where the upward trend growth of  real wages was quite 
strong, the shocks only slowed the growth of real wages relative to the earlier trend, 
but did not reduce real wages absolutely, except in 1980. 
32.  In Brazil, the labor movement has historically been rather weak and much less 
organized and militant than in neighboring Argentina and Bolivia. 
33. Either directly, through  sales of  a state trading company,  as in Bolivia and 
Mexico,  or  indirectly,  through  trade  taxes  and  royalty  payments  on  commodity 
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34.  The  revenues  may  be  generated  directly  by  state  enterprises  that  own  and 
produce the primary commodities (as in Mexico, where the state enterprise PEMEX 
is  responsible  for  all  oil  exports,  or  in  Bolivia,  where  the  state  tin  company, 
COMIBOL, and the state oil company, YPFB, generate a very large share of  total 
exports), or through export taxes (as in Argentina, which relies heavily on taxes on 
grain and meat exports). 
35.  Also,  in  Brazil  and  Turkey,  where  oil  imports  are  undertaken  by  a  state 
petroleum company, the rise in world oil prices can cause a significant budget deficit 
if  the state firm, under domestic political pressures,  is prevented from fully passing 
along to consumers the higher oil costs. Subsidies on oil imports was a large source 
of  Brazilian budget deficits after 1973 and again after 1979. 
36. In  Bolivia,  for  example,  during  the  1982-85  administration  of  President 
Hernan Siles Suazo, the Bolivian Congress refused to support various tax measures 
proposed by the government to bring the deficit under control, thereby increasing the 
reliance  on  central  bank  financing and  contributing  to  the  eventual  hyperinflation 
during  1984-85. 
37.  Of course, the recourse to borrowing in the face of a permanent external shock 
is feasible only in the short run; eventually the budget will have to adjust not only to 
the terms-of-trade decline, but  also to the debt-service  burden  on the accumulated 
debt that results from the borrowing strategy. Even so, postponement of  adjustment 
by the current government may make a lot of political sense, especially in a country 
with a rapid turnover of governments, where it can be expected that the political costs 
of adjustment will be borne by  a future government of  a different political party. In 
any event, a government may have no other option than borrowing, if it is unable to 
win legislative support for an austerity program. 
38.  Remember that this crowding out can be avoided if  consumption (public and 
private) is reduced via higher taxes and lower government spending. 
39.  The  highly  successful  Israeli  stabilization program  was  based  on  the  same 
principle.  But in contrast to the Latin American cases, the Israeli program actually 
implemented a large measure of budgetary restraint. 
40.  Nonetheless,  the  Mexican  government  was  still  able  during  1982-88  to 
impose harsh fiscal austerity measures and a sharp reduction of the real wage. These 
efforts were culminated at the end of 1987 in a new stabilization program christened 
the “Emergency  Social Pact.”  The program was successful during 1988 in reducing 
the inflation rate, but contributed to significant electoral setbacks for the PRI in the 
elections of  1988. The long-term success of the pact was still in question as of the 
end of 1988. 
41.  As I note below, the case of Bolivia is illuminating in this regard. Morales and 
Sachs stress that it was the Bolivian government’s suspension of interest payments to 
the commercial banks that gave the government the  “political  space”  to undertake 
the sharp austerity measures at home. 
42. See Sachs  (1988)  for  a  concise  statement  of  the  theory  of  adverse  effects 
from a debt overhang, as well as references to further discussion in the economics 
literature. 
43.  See also the discussion and critique of  the debt negotiation process in Sachs 
(1986, 1987, 1988). 
44.  The Bolivian debt arrangements are described at length in the monograph of 
Morales and Sachs, and in a separate article by Sachs (1988). 37  Introduction 
45. In the other cases of nonpayment to the banks, e.g., Brazil’s debt suspension 
during 1987, the official community has refused to extend new official loans. 
46. That is, the market believes that the expected discounted value of future net 
transfers from the debtor to the creditors is significantly less than the face value of the 
debt. 
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